Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Compared with the MPC based on garbled circuits, some recent research results show that MPC based on secret sharing (SS) works at a very high speed. Moreover, SS-based MPC can be easily vectorized and achieve higher throughput. In SS-based MPC, however, we need many communication rounds for computing concrete protocols like equality check, less-than comparison, etc. This property is not suited for large-latency environments like the Internet (or WAN). In this paper, we construct semi-honest secure communication-efficient two-party protocols. The core technique is Beaver triple extension, which is a new tool for treating multi-fan-in gates, and we also show how to use it efficiently. We mainly focus on reducing the number of communication rounds, and our protocols also succeed in reducing the number of communication bits (in most cases). As an example, we propose a less-than comparison protocol (under practical parameters) with three communication rounds. This is less than a half compared with the previous work. Moreover, the number of communication bits is also 38.4% fewer. As a result, total online execution time is 56.1% shorter than the previous work adopting the same settings. Although the computation costs of our protocols are more expensive than those of previous work, we confirm via experiments that such a disadvantage has small effects on the whole online performance in the typical WAN environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [32] , [18] allows a set of parties to compute a function f jointly while keeping their inputs private. More precisely, the N (≥ 2) parties, each holding private input x i for i ∈ [1, N ] , are able to compute the output f (x 1 , · · · , x N ) without revealing their private inputs x i . Some recent research showed there are many progresses in the research on MPC based on secret sharing (SS) and its performance is dramatically improved. SS-based MPC can be easily vectorized and suitable for parallel executions. We can obtain large throughput in SSbased MPC since we have no limit on the size of vectors. This is a unique property on SS-based MPC, and it is compatible with the SIMD operations like mini-batch training in privacypreserving machine learning. We cannot enjoy this advantage in the MPC based on garbled circuits (GC) or homomorphic encryption (HE). The most efficient MPC scheme so far is three-party computation (3PC) based on 2-out-of-3 SS. In twoparty computation (2PC), which is the focus of this paper, we need fewer hardware resources than 3PC. Although it does not work at high speed since we need heavy pre-computation, we can mitigate this problem by adopting slightly new MPC models like client/server-aided models that we denote later.
In addition to the advantage as denoted above, the amount of data transfer in online phase is also small in SS-based MPC than GC/HE-based one. However, the number of communication rounds we need for computation is large in SSbased MPC. We need one interaction between computing parties when we compute an arithmetic multiplication gate or a boolean AND gate, which is time-consuming when processing non-linear functions since it is difficult to make the circuit depth shallow. This is a critical disadvantage in real-world privacy-preserving applications since there are nonlinear functions we frequently use in practice like equality check, less-than comparison, max value extraction, activation functions in machine learning, etc. In most of the previous research, however, this problem has not been seriously treated. This is because they assumed there is (high-speed) LAN connection between computing parties. Under such environments, total online execution time we need for processing nonlinear functions is small even if we need many interactions between computing parties since the communication latency is usually very short (typically ≤ 0.5ms). This assumption is somewhat strange in practice, as the use of LAN suggests that MPC is executed on the network that is maintained by the same administrator/organization. In that case, it is not clear if the requirement for SS that parties do not collude is held or not. Hence, it looks more suitable to assume non-local networks like WAN. However, large communication latency in WAN becomes the performance bottleneck in SS-based MPC. We find by our experiments that the time caused by the communication latency occupies more than 99% in some cases for online total execution time. To reduce the effect of the large communication latency, it is important to develop SS-based MPC with fewer communication rounds. In other words, we should put in work to make the circuit shallower to improve the concrete efficiency of SS-based MPC.
A. Related Work 1) MPC Based on Secret Sharing: There are many research results on SS-based MPC. For example, we have results on highly-efficient MPC (e.g., [2] , [9] ), concrete tools or the toolkit (e.g., [12] , [28] , [5] , [27] ), mixed-protocol framework [13] , [31] , [24] , application to privacy-preserving machine learning or data analysis (e.g., [26] , [21] , [31] , [24] , 
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Overview of our contribution and paper organization. We show our new protocols with capital character. We show experimental results in Section V for the gates/protocols with red character. [10] ), proposal of another model for speeding up the precomputation [23] , [26] , etc. As denoted previously, however, we have not been able to obtain good experimental results for computing large circuits over WAN environments. For example, [26] denoted the neural network training on WAN setting is not practical yet.
2) MPC Based on Garbled Circuit or Homomorphic Encryption: There are also many research results on GC/HEbased MPC. For example, we have results on the toolkit (e.g., [22] ), encryption switching protocols [11] , application to private set intersection (e.g., [30] ) or privacy-preserving machine learning (e.g., [6] , [16] , [29] , [7] , [19] , [20] ), etc. Recently, we have many research results on GC for more than three parties (e.g., [25] , [34] ) and Arithmetic GC (e.g., [1] ). Note that it is difficult to improve the circuit size on standard boolean GC [33] , which is a bottleneck on GC-based MPC. Moreover, [4] , [8] proposed the GC-based MPC for WAN environments and showed the benchmark using AES, etc. In all these results based on GC/HE, the non/poor-vectorizability mentioned above makes it difficult to achieve high throughput.
B. Our Contribution
We show our contribution (and paper organization) in Figure. 1. There are two main contributions in this paper. First, (1) we propose the method for treating multi-fan-in gates in semi-honest secure SS-based 2PC and show how to use them efficiently. Second, (2) we propose many roundefficient protocols and show their performance evaluations via experiments. We explain the details of them as follows: 1) We propose the method for treating multi-fan-in MULT/AND gates over Z 2 n and some techniques for reducing the communication rounds of protocols.
Our N -fan-in gates are based on the extension of Beaver triples, which is a technique for computing standard 2-fan-in gates. In our technique, however, we have a disadvantage that the computation costs and the memory costs are exponentially increased by N ; that is, we have to limit the size of N in practice. On the other hand, we can improve the costs of communication. More concretely, we can compute arbitrary N -fan-in MULT/AND with one communication round and the amount of data transfer is also improved. Moreover, we show performance evaluation results on above multi-fan-in gates via experiments. More concretely, see Sections III and V-A. 2) We propose round-efficient protocols using multifan-in gates. We need fewer interactions for our protocols between computing parties in online phase than previous ones. When we use shares over Z 2 32 , for example, we need the communication rounds as follows: Equality : (5 → 2), Comparison : (7 → 3), and Max for 3 elements: (18 → 4) . Moreover, we show the performance evaluation results on our protocols via experiments. From our experiments, we find the computation costs for multi-fan-in gates and protocols based on them have small effects on the whole online performance in the typical WAN environments. We also implement an application (a privacy-preserving exact edit distance protocol for genome strings) using our protocols. More concretely, see Sections IV, V-B, and V-C.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the building blocks for our protocols and settings used in this paper.
A. Syntax for Secret Sharing
A 2-out-of-2 secret sharing ((2, 2)-SS) scheme over Z 2 n consists of two algorithms: Share and Reconst. Share takes as input x ∈ Z 2 n , and outputs ( x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ Z 2 2 n , where the bracket notation x i denotes the share of the i-th party (for i ∈ {0, 1}). We denote x = ( x 0 , x 1 ) as their shorthand. Reconst takes as input x , and outputs x. For arithmetic sharing and boolean sharing, we consider powerof-two integers n (e.g. n = 64) and n = 1, respectively.
B. Secure Two-Party Computation Based on (2, 2)-Additive Secret Sharing 1) Arithmetic Gates: We explain how to compute arithmetic ADD/MULT gates on (2, 2)-additive SS. We use the standard (2, 2)-additive SS scheme, defined by
We can compute fundamental operations: ADD(x, y) := x + y and MULT(x, y) := xy as follows:
• z ← ADD( x , y ) can be done locally by just adding each party's share on x and on y.
• w ← MULT( x , y ) can be done in various ways. We will use the standard method based on Beaver triples (BT) [3] . Such a triple consists of bt 0 = (a 0 , b 0 , c 0 ) and bt 1 = (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 ) such that
Hereafter, a, b, and c denote a 0 + a 1 , b 0 + b 1 , and c 0 + c 1 , respectively. We can compute these BT in offline phase. In this protocol, each i-th party P i (i ∈ {0, 1}) can compute the multiplication share z i = xy i as follows: 1) P i first compute ( x i − a i ) and ( y i − b i ).
2) P i sends them to P 1−i . 3) P i reconstruct x = x − a and y = y − b. 4) P 0 computes z 0 = x y + x b 0 + y a 0 + c 0 and P 1 computes z 1 = x b 1 + y a 1 + c 1 . z 0 and z 1 calculated as above procedures are valid shares of xy; that is, Reconst( z 0 , z 1 ) = xy.
We abuse notations and write the ADD and MULT protocols simply as x + y and x · y , respectively. Note that similarly to the ADD protocol, we can also locally compute multiplication by constant c, denoted by c · x .
2) Boolean Gates: In boolean XOR/AND gates, we use the standard (2, 2)-SS scheme, defined by
By converting + and − to ⊕ in arithmetic ADD and MULT protocol, we can obtain XOR and AND protocol, respectively. We can construct NOT and OR protocols from the properties of these gates as follows:
• OR( x , y ): From a basic property of OR gate, we can construct OR by combining NOT and AND; that is, OR( x , y ) = ¬AND(¬ x , ¬ y ).
We abuse notations and write the XOR, AND, NOT, and OR protocols simply as x ⊕ y , x ∧ y , ¬ x (or x ), and x ∨ y , respectively.
C. Semi-Honest Security
Here, we recall the simulation-based security notion in the presence of semi-honest adversaries (for 2PC) as in [17] .
, where x i represents P i 's input, r i represents its internal random coins, and m i,j represents the j-th message that P i has received. The output of all parties after an execution of Π on input x is denoted as OUTPUT Π ( x). Then for each party P i , we say that Π privately computes f in the presence of semi-honest corrupted party P i if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S such that
, OUTPUT Π ( x))} where the symbol ≡ means that the two probability distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
As described in [17] , composition theorem for the semihonest model holds; that is, any protocol is privately computed as long as its subroutines are privately computed.
D. Client-Aided Model
In this paper, we adopt client-aided model [26] , [27] (or server-aided model [23] ) for 2PC. In this model, a client (other than computing parties) generates and distributes shares of secrets. Moreover, the client also generates and distributes some necessary BTs to the computing parties. This improves the efficiency of offline computation dramatically since otherwise computing parties would have to generate BTs by themselves jointly via heavy cryptographic primitives like homomorphic encryption or oblivious transfer. The only downside for this model is the restriction that any computing party is assumed to not collude with the client who generates BTs for keeping the security.
III. CORE TOOLS FOR ROUND-EFFICIENT PROTOCOLS
In this section, we propose a core tool for round-efficient 2PC that we call "beaver triple extension (BTE)". Moreover, we explain some techniques for pre-computation to reduce the communication rounds in online phase.
A. Example: 3-fan-in MULT/AND via 3-Beaver Triple Extension
Here, we explain the case of 3-fan-in gates as an example. First, we recall how to compute a 2-fan-in MULT using (standard) BT in Section II-B. In this setting, P 0 computes z 0 = x y + x b 0 + y a 0 + c 0 and P 1 computes z 1 = x b 1 + y a 1 + c 1 . When we execute the Reconst algorithm, we add these two shares.
This calculation result is equal to xy since the condition c = ab holds. We can see that thanks to the properties of the BTs, we can cancel the terms coming out from (x − a)(y − b) other than xy.
We consider how to extend this mechanism for a 3-fan-in MULT gate (3-MULT); that is, we consider how to construct a special BT that cancels the terms coming out from (x−a)(y − b)(z −c) other than xyz. We can obtain such one by extending the standard BT. It consists of (a 0 , b 0 , c 0 , d 0 , e 0 , f 0 , g 0 ) for P 0 and (a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , d 1 , e 1 , f 1 , g 1 ) for P 1 that satisfy the following properties:
• a 0 + a 1 = a, · · · , g 0 + g 1 = g
• ab = d, bc = e, ca = f
We call the above special BT as 3-Beaver triple extension (3-BTE) in this paper. We can compute the 3-MULT using above 3-BTE as follows:
2) P i send them to another party. 2) Client sends all the a I 0 to P 0 and all the a I 1 to P 1 .
Note that, in the protocol above, the process of randomly choosing a I 0 and then setting a I 1 ← a I − a I 0 is equivalent to randomly choosing a I 1 and then setting a I 0 ← a I − a I 1 . Therefore, the roles of P 0 and P 1 are symmetric.
2) Multiplication Protocol: For i = 1, . . . , N , let ( x i 0 , x i 1 ) be given shares of i-th secret input value x i ∈ M. The protocol for multiplication is constructed as follows: 1) Client generates and distributes N -BTE ( a I 0 ) I and ( a I 1 ) I to the two parties as described above. 2) For k = 0, 1, P k computes x i k ← x i k − a {i} k for i = 1, . . . , N and sends those x i k to P 1−k . 3) For k = 0, 1, P k computes x i ← x i 1−k + x i k − a {i} k for i = 1, . . . , N . 4) P 0 outputs y 0 given by
while P 1 outputs y 1 given by
3) Correctness of the Protocol: We have
Since a I = j∈I a {j} , we have
Hence y 0 and y 1 form shares of x 1 · · · x N , as desired.
4) Security
Proof of the Protocol: First we consider the security of the multiplication protocol against semi-honest P 0 (not colluding with Client). Let ( x i 0 , x i 1 ) (i = 1, . . . , N ) be fixed input shares, and let ζ ∈ M. We consider the conditional distribution of the view of P 0 for the case where the local output is y 0 = ζ.
The view of P 0 consists of a I 0 for ∅ = I ⊆ [1, N ] and x i 1 for i = 1, . . . , N (note that the party uses no randomness in the protocol). Let α I for ∅ = I ⊆ [1, N ] and γ i for i = 1, . . . , N be elements of M. Let E denote the corresponding event that a I 0 = α I holds for any ∅ = I ⊆ [1, N ] and x i 1 = γ i holds for any i = 1, . . . , N . By the construction of the protocol, if the event E occurs and moreover y 0 = ζ, then we have
This implies that the conditional probability Pr
We consider the other case where ζ = α [1,N ] and of x i 1 there is precisely one possibility of a [1,N ] 
The argument above implies that, the distribution of the view of P 0 for fixed inputs and given local output y 0 = ζ is the uniform distribution on the set of tuples ((α I ) I , (γ i ) i ) of elements of M satisfying α [1,N ] 
The latter distribution can be sampled by freely choosing α I for I = [1, N ] and γ i for i = 1, . . . , N and then adjusting the value of α [1,N ] . Hence, the view of P 0 is efficiently and perfectly simulatable, implying the security against semihonest P 0 . The argument showing the security against semihonest P 1 is similar (due to the aforementioned symmetry of the two parties in generating BTE), where we use the function ϕ 1 instead of ϕ 0 given by
This concludes the security proof of the protocol.
C. Discussion on Beaver Triple Extension
We can achieve the same functionality of N -MULT/AND by using 2-MULT/AND multiple times and there are some trade-offs between these two strategies. We show these tradeoffs in Table I and discuss computation/communication costs in this section. In this table, memory cost means the number of elements we need for BT(E). A and M are the meaning of addition and multiplication, respectively. We assume that the circuit to compute N -AND using multiple 2-ANDs is composed in a tree for reducing the circuit depth. As described later, our protocols based on BTE have intermediate property between SS-based protocols only using 2-fan-in gates and MPCs based on garbled circuits.
1) Memory and Computation Cost:
In the computation of N -fan-in MULT/AND using N -BTE, the memory consumption and computation cost increase exponentially with N . Therefore, we have to put a restriction on the size of N and concrete settings change optimal N . In this paper, we use N -MULT/AND for N ≤ 9 to construct round-efficient protocols.
2) Communication Cost: N -fan-in MULT/AND using N -BTE needs fewer communication costs. Notably, the number of communication rounds of our protocol does not depend on N and this improvement has significant effects on practical performances in WAN settings. Because of the problems on the memory/computation costs we denoted above, however, there is a limitation for the size of N . When we use L-fan-in MULT/AND (L ≤ N ) gates, we need log N log L communication rounds for computing N -fan-in MULT/AND. When we set L = 8, for example, we need two communication rounds to compute a 64-fan-in AND.
3) Comparison with Previous Work: Damgård et al. [12] also proposed how to compute N -fan-in gates in a roundefficient manner using Lagrange interpolation. Each of their scheme and ours has its merits and demerits. Their scheme has an advantage over memory consumption and computational costs; that is, their N -fan-in gates do not need exponentially large memory and computation costs. On the other hand, their scheme needs two communication rounds to compute N -fanin gates for any N and requires the share spaces to be Z p (p: prime). A 2PC scheme over Z 2 n is sometimes more efficient than one over Z p when we implement them using low-level language (e.g., C++) since we do not have to compute modulo of 2 n for all arithmetic operations.
D. More Techniques for Reducing Communication Rounds
In this section, we explain three techniques we use to construct round-efficient protocols in Section IV.
1) Local Bit Aggregation:
We consider the plain input x that all bits are 0, or only a single bit is 1 and others are 0. For example, we consider x = 00100000 and its boolean shares ( x B 0 , x B 1 ) = (10011011, 10111011). We find these are correct boolean shares of x since x B 0 ⊕ x B 1 = x holds. In this setting, we can compute the share representing whether all the bits of x are 0 or not without communications between P 0 and P 1 . More concretely, we can compute it by locally computing XOR for all bits on each share. In the above example, P 0 and P 1 compute
This technique is implicitly used in the previous work [5] for constructing an arithmetic overflow detection protocol (Overflow), which is a important building block for constructing less-than comparison and more. We show more skillful use of this technique for constructing Overflow to avoid heavy computation in our protocols. More concretely, see the Section IV-B.
2) Partial Disclosure of Beaver Triple: We consider the situation that two clients who have secrets also execute computation (means, an input party is equal to a computing party), which is the different setting from client-aided 2PC. In this case, P 0 and P 1 randomly split the secret x and y into x 0 , x 1 and y 0 , y 1 , respectively. Then P 0 sends x 1 to P 1 and P 1 sends y 0 to P 0 . If P 0 and P 1 previously obtain a 0 , b 0 , c 0 and a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , respectively, P 0 and P 1 can compute z = xy via the standard multiplication protocol. During this procedure, both P 0 and P 1 obtain x−a and y −b. Here, P 0 finds a and P 1 finds b since P 0 and P 1 know the value of x and y, respectively. Therefore, it does not matter if P 0 and P 1 previously know the corresponding values; that is, P 0 can send b 0 to P 1 and P 1 can send a 1 to P 0 in the pre-computation phase. This operation does not cause security problems.
By above pre-processing, P 0 and P 1 can directly send x − a and y − b in the multiplication protocol, respectively. As a result, we can reduce the amount of data transfer in the multiplication protocol. Note that in the setting that the input party is not equal to the computing party (e.g., standard clientaided 2PC), this pre-processing does not work well since P 0 and P 1 do not have x and y, respectively and cannot compute z = xy correctly. Even in the client-aided 2PC setting, however, this situation appears in the boolean-to-arithmetic conversion protocol. More concretely, please see Section IV-C.
3) Regarding Shares as Secrets:
We consider the setting that an input party is not equal to a computing party, which is the same one as standard client-aided 2PC. In this situation, we can use the share b i (i ∈ {0, 1}) itself as a secret value for computations by considering another party has the share 0 1−i . Although we find this technique in the previous work [5] , we can further reduce the communication rounds of two-party protocols by combining this technique and BTE. More concretely, see Section IV-C.
IV. COMMUNITATION-EFFICIENT PROTOCOLS
In this section, we show round-efficient 2PC protocols using BTE and the techniques in Section III-D. For simplicity, in this section, we set a share space to Z 2 16 and use N (≤ 5)-fanin gates to explain our proposed protocols. Although we omit the protocols over Z 2 32 /Z 2 64 due to the page limitation, we can obtain the protocols with the same communication rounds with
Memory Cost
Comp. Cost # of Comm. Bits # of Comm. Rounds Multiple Use of 2-AND 3(N − 1) 
Z 2 16 by using 7/9 or less fan-in AND, respectively. We omit the correctness of the protocols adopting the same strategy in the previous work [5] .
A. Equality Check Protocol and Its Application
An equality check protocol Equality( x A , y A ) outputs z B , where z = 1 iff x = y. We start from the approach by [5] and focus on reducing communication rounds. In Equality, roughly speaking, we first compute t = x − y and then check all bits of t are 0 or not. If all the bits of t are 0, it means t = x − y = 0. Although we can perform this functionality via 16-OR, we cannot directly execute such a large-fan-in OR gate. We need log 2 16 = 4 communication rounds for the above procedure if we only use 2-OR with a tree structure. However, if we can use 4-OR, we can execute Equality with log 4 16 = 2 communication rounds. We show our two-round Equality as in Algorithm 1: In this strategy, more generally, we need log n log L communication rounds for executing Equality when we set the share space to Z 2 n and use N (≤ L)-OR.
1) Application: Table Lookup:
We can obtain a roundefficient table lookup protocol TLU (or, 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer) using our Equality. As shown in previous results, TLU is useful function in secure computation (e.g., [14] ). Here, we consider the table of arithmetic keys/values with size L (pairs of a j-th key K j and a j-th value V j for j ∈ [0, · · · , L − 1]). We consider the situation that each computing party has shares of the table and a share of the index id A i and wants to obtain a share of the value V j where id = K j . To execute this protocol, we first check the equality of id and K j for j ∈ [0, · · · , L − 1] via Equality. Then, we extract V j using BX2A (in Section IV-C). We only need three communication rounds for this TLU.
B. Overflow Detection Protocol and Applications
An arithmetic overflow detection protocol Overflow has many applications and is also a core building block of lessthan comparison protocol. The same as the approach by [5] , 5, 9, 13] , and , 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14] .
we construct Overflow via the most significant non-zero bit extraction protocol MSNZB. We first explain how to construct MSNZB efficiently and then show two-round Overflow.
A protocol for extracting the most significant non-zero bit (MSNZB( x B = [ x [15] B , · · · , x[0] B ])) finds the position of the first "1" of the x and outputs such a boolean share vector z B = [ z [15] B , · · · , z[0] B ]; that is, for example, if x = 0010011100010000, then z = 0010000000000000. In the protocol by [5] , we find the position of the first "1" in x in a privacy-preserving manner using a "prefix-OR" operation. In this procedure, we first replace further to the right bits than leftmost 1 with 1 via 2-OR gates and obtain x = 0 · · · 011 · · · 1. Then, we compute z = x ⊕(x 1). In this MSNZB, we need four communication rounds since 2-OR runs four times even if we parallelize the processing. Intuitively, we can construct two-round MSNZB via 4-OR; that is, we compute multi-fanin prefix-OR using N (≤ 4)-OR. In this intuitive two-round MSNZB, however, computation costs significantly increase since we have to compute 4-OR many (= 13 + 4) times. Therefore, we consider how to reduce them while keeping the number of communication rounds. We show our MSNZB as in Algorithm 2 and 
Overflow is an important building block of many other protocols that appear in the later of this section. We also start from the approach by [5] . In their Overflow, we check whether or not there exists 1 in u = (− x 1 mod 2 k ) at the same position of MSNZB on d = (( x 0 mod 2 k ) ⊕ (− x 1 mod 2 k )). Even if we apply our two-round MSNZB in this section, we need three communication rounds for their Overflow since we need one more round to check the above condition using 2-AND. Here, we consider further improvements by combining MSNZB and 2-AND; that is, we increase the fan-in of AND on the step 4 in Algorithm 2 and push the computation of 2-AND into that step as in Algorithm 3: In our Overflow, we need a communication for the steps 2 and 6 in Algorithm 3 and succeed in constructing two-round Overflow using N (≤ 5)fan-in AND over Z 2 16 . If we set the share space to Z 2 32 /Z 2 64 , we need to use N (≤ 7/9)-AND for constructing two-round Overflow, respectively. Moreover, in Appendix VII, we show more round-efficient Overflow. Although we need more computation and data transfer than Overflow in this section, we can compute Overflow with one communication round (for small share spaces in practice).
1) Application 1: Less-Than Comparison:
A less-than comparison protocol (Comparison( x A , y A )) outputs z B , where z = 1 iff the condition x < y holds. The high-level construction of this protocol is completely the same as in [5] ; that is,
. P 1 also locally extends (− x A 1 mod 2 k ) to the binary and obtains d B 7, 11, 15] . , 5, 9, 13] , and , 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14] .
holds or not using Overflow and then compute x B = of x B ⊕ msb x B (and the same for y and d = x − y, and obtain y B and d B ). Here, of x denote the execution results of the above Overflow and msb x denote the most significant bit of (binary expanded) x. We can extract the most significant bit of x, y, and d via the above operations.
Thanks to the round-efficient Overflow, we can obtain threeround Comparison. Morita et al. [27] proposed constant (= five)-round Comparison using multi-fan-in gates that work under the shares over Z p [12] . Our Comparison is more roundefficient than theirs under the parameters we consider in this paper.
Algorithm 4 Our Proposed B2A
1: In pre-computation phase, the client randomly chooses a, b ∈ Z 2 16 , computes c = ab, chooses a randomness r ∈ Z 2 16 , and sets (c 0 , c 1 ) = (r, c − r). Then the client sends P 0 and P 1 to (a, c 0 ) and (b, c 1 ), respectively.
Then they send them to each other. 4 
We can construct three-round Rightshift using our Overflow as follows:
3) Application 3: Arithmetic Division: An arithmetic division protocol (with private divisor) Division( N A , D A ) outputs z A , where z = N D . We can improve the round complexity of Division since it calls Overflow and Rightshift many times as subroutines. Due to the lack of space, we omit the concrete construction of Division in this paper (see [5] ).
C. Boolean-to-Arithmetic Conversion Protocol and Extensions
A boolean-to-arithmetic conversion protocol (B2A( x B )) outputs z A , where z = x. In (1-bit) boolean shares, there are four cases; that is, ( x B 0 , x B 1 ) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) . Even if we consider these boolean shares as arithmetic ones, it works well in the first three cases; that is, 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 + 0, 0 ⊕ 1 = 0 + 1, and 1 ⊕ 0 = 1 + 0. However, 1 ⊕ 1 = 1 + 1 and we have to correct the output of this case. Based on this idea and the technique in Section III-D (regarding shares as secrets), [5] proposed the construction of B2A as follows:
In this protocol, we use a standard arithmetic multiplication protocol and need one communication round. In the setting of client-aided 2PC, however, B2A satisfies the condition that input party is equal to the computing party. Therefore, we can apply the techniques in Section III-D (partial disclosure of BT) and construct more efficient B2A as in Algorithm 4:
Although the number of communication rounds is the same as in [5] , our protocol is more efficient in the following points:
1) The data transfer in online phase is reduced from 2nbits to n-bits. In the previous protocol, we need to send 2n-bits to each other since we have to execute the (standard) arithmetic multiplication protocol. In our protocol, however, P 0 and P 1 only need to send ( x B 0 − a) and ( x B 1 − b), respectively. 2) Pre-computation becomes more efficient. First, the number of randomnesses we need in pre-computation is reduced from five to three. In the previous protocol the client chooses two randomnesses a, b, computes c = ab, and splits three values (a, b, c) into shares using three randomnesses. In our protocol, on the other hand, the client does not need to split a and b. Second, the data amount for sending from the client to P 0 and P 1 is reduced from 3n-bits to 2n-bits. In our protocol, the client only needs to send (a, c 0 ) and (b, c 1 ) to P 0 and P 1 , respectively.
We usually need to compute the multiplication of a boolean share b B and an arithmetic one x A (e.g., TLU in Section IV-A1, ReLU function in neural networks). We call this protocol BX2A in this paper. [24] proposed one-round BX2A under the (2, 3)replicated SS, such construction in 2PC has not been known. By almost the same idea as B2A, we can construct one-
with one communication round. We use this protocol in 3-Argmax/3-Argmin in Section IV-D. We can construct oneround BC2A by computing
We need 2/4-MULT for this protocol.
3) Extension 3:
Almost the same idea as the above protocols, we can also compute b B × c B × x A = bc A (BCX2A) with one communication round. We use this protocol in Max/Min in Section IV-D. We can construct one-round BC2A by computing
We need 3/5-MULT for this protocol.
D. The Maximum Value Extraction Protocol and Extensions
The maximum value extraction protocol Max( x A ) outputs z A , where z is the largest value in x. We first explain the case of Max for three elements (3-Max), which is used Algorithm 5 Our Proposed 3-Max
for computing edit distance, etc. We denote a j-th element of
We start from a standard tournament-based construction. We can extract the larger value among x[0] and x [1] as follows:
If the condition x[0] < x [1] holds, x = x [1] . Otherwise, x = x[0]. By repeating the above procedure once more using x A and x[2] A , we can extract the maximum value among x. In this strategy, we need 16 (= (6 + 1 + 1) × 2) communication rounds, and 8 (= (3 + 1) × 2) communication rounds even if we apply our three-round Comparison (in Section IV-B1) and BX2A (in Section IV-C1). This is mainly because we cannot parallelly execute Comparison. To solve this disadvantage, we first check the magnitude relationship for all elements using Comparison. Then we extract the maximum value. Based on these ideas, we show our 3-Max as in Algorithm 5: Although the computation costs obviously increased, this is four-round 3-Max by applying our Comparison and BCX2A.
1) Extension 1: The Minimum Value Extraction Protocol:
We can easily convert Max into Min by replacing the input order in step 1 in Algorithm 5 and obtain the minimum value extraction protocol for three elements (3-Min). We use this 3-Min for executing privacy-preserving exact edit distance protocol in Section V-C.
2) Extension 2: Argmax and Argmin: We can easily obtain Argmax/Argmin) by modifying Max/Min) as follows:
in the step 4 in Algorithm 5, .
We can execute Argmax/Argmin with three communication rounds. We need fewer communication bits since we can avoid using BCX2A in these protocols. Note that in the above step 2), we need no interaction between computing parties since j is public.
3) Extension 3: N -Max/Min for N > 3: Even in the cases of Max/Min for four or more elements, we can construct round-efficient Max/Min with the same strategy as in Algorithm 5. However, there are two points of notice as follows: 1) In N -Max/Min, we need to (parallelly) execute Comparison N (N −1) 2 times. In the tournament-based strategy, we only need to execute Comparison for log N times; that is, in our protocols, computation costs and the amount of communication bits rapidly increase with respect to N . 2) For large N , we cannot directly use BCX2A (or BC2A). Although we can construct the protocol like
we can easily imagine that the computation costs we need for such a protocol increase drastically. To avoid such a disadvantage, we should split the step 3 in Algorithm 5 into some other protocols (e.g., (N − 1)-AND and BX2A). This means we need more communication rounds to execute N -Max/Min for large N .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We demonstrate the practicality of our arithmetic/boolean gates and protocols. We implemented 2PC simulators and performed all benchmarks on a single laptop computer with Intel Core i7-6700K 4.00GHz and 64GB RAM. We implemented simulators using Python 3.7 with Numpy v1.16.2 and vectorized all gates/protocols. We employ standard os.urandom function to perform cryptographic randomness generation in our experiments. We assumed 10MB/s (= 80000bits/ms) bandwidth and 40ms RTT latency as typical WAN settings. We calculated the data transfer time (DTT) and communication latency (CL) as follows:
DTT (ms) = (# of comm. bits) 80000 CL (ms) = 40 × (# of comm. rounds) We adopted the client-aided model; that is, we assumed in our experiments that clients generate BTE in their local environment without using HE/OT.
A. Performance of Basic Gates
Here we show experimental results on N -AND. We set N = [2, · · · , 9] and 1 to 10 6 (= 1000000) batch in our experiments. Here we show the experimental results on the cases of 1/1000/1000000 batch. The experimental results on other cases (10/100/10000/100000 batch) are in Appendix VIII. The results are as in Table II and If we compute N (> 2)-AND using multiple 2-AND gates, we need two or more communication rounds. Therefore, our scheme is especially suitable for the 2PC with relatively small batch (e.g., ≤ 10 5 ) as it yields low WAN latency. 
B. Performance of Our Protocols
Here we show experimental results on our proposed protocols (Equality, Comparison, and 3-Max). We implemented the baseline protocols [5] and our proposed ones in Section IV. Same as the evaluation of N -AND, we here show the results over Z 2 32 with 1/1000/1000000 batch in our experiments. Other results (protocols over Z 2 16 , Z 2 64 , and Z 2 32 with other batch sizes) are in Appendix VIII. The results are as in Table III (1 batch), Table IV (1000 batch) , Table V (1000000 batch), Figure 4 (relations between batch size and online execution time), and Figure 5 (throughput of baseline/our protocols): Same as the cases with N -AND, WAN latency is the dominant part of the online total execution time. In relatively small batch (≤ 10 4 ), all our protocols are faster than baseline ones in the online total execution time since ours require fewer communication rounds. For example in Comparison with 1 batch, we need more online computation time than the baseline one (0.54ms → 2.1ms). However, communication costs of our Comparison are smaller than baseline one (the number of communication rounds: 7 → 3, the number of communication bits: 970 → 712). As a result, our Comparison is 56.1% faster than baseline one (280.6ms → 122.1ms) in our WAN settings. As already mentioned, our protocols are not suitable for a (extremely) large batch since the computation cost is larger than baseline ones. However, our experiments show that our protocol achieves higher throughput if the unit time is shorter than 1s.
C. Privacy-Preserving (Exact) Edit Distance
We implemented a privacy-preserving edit distance protocol using our protocols (Equality, B2A, and 3-Min). Unlike many previous works on approximate edit distance, here we consider the exact edit distance.. We computed an edit distance between two length-L genome strings (S 0 and S 1 ) via standard dynamic programming (DP). It appears four characters in the strings; that is, A, T, G, and C. In DP-matrix, we fill the cell x[i][j] by the following rule:
Here, e = 0 if the condition S 0 [i] = S 1 [j] holds, and otherwise e = 1. We can compute e using Equality (two rounds) and B2A (one round). To reduce the total online execution time, we calculate the edit distance as follows: 1) To reduce the total communication rounds, we parallelly compute e for all cells and store them in advance. Thanks to this procedure, we can avoid calculating e every time when we fill cells. We only need three communication rounds for this step. 2) Diagonal cells in DP-matrix are independent with each other. Therefore, we can parallelly compute these cells By applying the above techniques, we can compute exact edit distance for two length-L two strings with 3 + 4(2L − 1) = (8L−1) communication rounds. We used the arithmetic shares and protocols over Z 2 16 in our experiments. The experimental results are as in Table VI and Figure 6 : As we can see from the experimental results, most of the online total execution time is occupied by the communication latency; that is, GCbased approaches may be much faster than SS-based one in WAN environments. However, if we would like to compute edit distances between many strings at the same time (e.g., the situation that the client has one string and the server has 1000 strings, and the client would like to compute edit distances between client's string and all of server's strings), SS-based approach will be much faster than GC-based one. 
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Here we discuss our schemes and their limitations, and show some future works.
A. On the Pre-Computation
As shown in the tables on our experiments, we need heavy pre-computation in our schemes. We investigate the reason of this problem and find that it is almost because of the randomness generation. That is, we can shorten the pre-computation time by adopting hardware acceleration (e.g., fixed-key AES-NI) to generate cryptographic randomness. We did not employ such acceleration in our experiments since we focus on the online execution time in this paper. However, we cannot improve the heavy memory costs we need for our protocols even if we adopt the above acceleration. Achieving both memory/communication-efficient two-party protocols is an interesting future work.
B. A Trade-Off Between the Number of Communciation Rounds/Bits
There sometimes exists a trade-off between the number of communication rounds and communication bits. In 3-Max, for example, we showed the round-optimized 3-Max protocol in Section IV. The number of communication bits we need for this protocol is slightly large since our BCX2A protocol uses high-cost 3/5-MULT as building blocks. By replacing BCX2A with (2-AND + BX2A) or (2-AND + B2A + 2-MULT), we can easily obtain five/six-round variants with fewer communication bits. More concretely, we can construct three 3-Max protocols with the properties as in table VII: As shown in our experimental results, we should use the round-optimized protocol when the batch size is relatively small. In the case of a large batch, however, the protocol with fewer communication bits is more efficient in total.
C. On the Cases with a Large Batch
As shown in Figure 5 , our protocols achieve higher throughput than the previous result in WAN settings when unit time is shorter than 1s. In a large batch (e.g., > 10 6 ), however, we need more time to execute our protocols than previous ones since the computation cost of our protocols is more expensive. In this situation, the effect of reducing communication rounds is small on the whole online performance. Developing communication-efficient protocols without expanding the computation cost is also an interesting future work. Moreover, we should consider implementation-level speeding up in MPC with a large batch. In a GC-based approach, there is a result on MPC using GPU [15] . We may also improve the computation time of SS-based MPC using the similar approach.
VII. ONE-ROUND Overflow
In this section, we explain another construction of Overflow. Although we need more computation and data transfer than two-round Overflow in Section IV-B, we can compute the following Overflow with one communication round (for slightly small share spaces in practice). Here, n 1 and n 2 are parameters with n = n 1 + n 2 :
where y i is the n 1 most significant bits of x i and z i is the n 2 least significant bits of x i . 2) For each a 1 = 1, . . . , 2 n1 − 1, a) P 0 sets α
Let α a1;j B = (α a1;j 0 , α a1;j 1 ) for j = 1, 2.
3) For each a 2 = 1, . . . , 2 n2 − 1 and j = 0, . . . , n 1 − 1, P 0 sets by using 4-AND. 6) P i locally compute
Then P i output the share d B i .
All the steps except Step 5 can be locally executed by each party. Hence, in total, only 1 round of communication is required which is spent during Step 5, where (2 n1 − 1) 2-ANDs, (2 n2 − 1) n 1 -ANDs, and (2 n2 − 1) 4-ANDs are performed in parallel. For examples, when n = 15 and (n 1 , n 2 ) = (8, 7), these are 255 2-ANDs, 127 8-ANDs, and 127 4-ANDs.
2) Correctness: First, we note that an overflow occurs modulo 2 n for (x 0 , x 1 ) if and only if, either an overflow occurs modulo 2 n1 for (y 0 , y 1 ), or y 0 + y 1 = 2 n1 − 1 and an overflow occurs modulo 2 n2 for (z 0 , z 1 ). As the two events are disjoint, it follows that
Moreover, we have
therefore Overflow(x 0 , x 1 ; 2 n ) is the XOR of Overflow(y 0 , y 1 ; 2 n1 ) and
For the term Overflow(y 0 , y 1 ; 2 n1 ), we note that the overflow occurs if and only if there is a (in fact, unique) a 1 = 1, . . . , 2 n1 − 1 satisfying that y 0 = a 1 and a 1 + y 1 ≥ 2 n1 (i.e., y 1 ≥ 2 n1 − a 1 ). These 2 n1 − 1 events are all disjoint. In the protocol, the bit α a1;1 is 1 if and only if y 0 = a 1 , and the bit α a1;2 is 1 if and only if y 1 ≥ 2 n1 − a 1 . Therefore, we have Overflow(y 0 , y 1 ; 2 n1 ) =
The same argument implies that, the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to
To decrease the depth of the circuit in Eq. (2), we consider to let P 0 modify the bits y 0 [j] in a way that the AND-term becomes 0 if z 0 (known to P 0 ) is not equal to a 2 . Now observe that, unless y 1 = 0, at least one of the bits y 1 [j] is 1, therefore the AND-term would become 0 if all bits y 0 [j] were 1. Accordingly, instead of y 0 [j], we use a bit y 0 [j] a2 that is y 0 [j] if z 0 = a 2 and is 1 if z 0 = a 2 . Then we have
unless y 1 = 0. Similarly, we let P 1 modify the bits y 1 [j] in a way that the AND-term becomes 0 if z 1 (known to P 1 ) is smaller than 2 2 − a 2 . Namely, instead of y 1 [j], we use a bit y 1 [j] a2 that is y 1 [j] if z 1 ≥ 2 n2 − a 2 and is 1 otherwise. Then the same argument implies that Now we want to adjust the computation result in the case where y 0 = 0 or y 1 = 0. Before doing that, we modify the computation further in order to simplify the situation: for i = 0, 1, we change the bits y i [j] a2 in a way that it always becomes 1 when y i = 0. The resulting bit is equal to β a2;j i in the protocol, and the corresponding computation result 
is still equal to the bit in Eq.(1) unless y 0 = 0 or y 1 = 0. On the other hand, when y 0 = 0 or y 1 = 0, the bit in Eq.(3) is equal to 0, as now one of the two vectors (β a2;0 i . . . . , β a2;n1−1 i ) (i = 0, 1) is (1, 1, . . . , 1) while the other has at least one component being 1. When y 0 = y 1 = 0, the bit in Eq.(1) is also equal to 0 and hence is equal to the bit in Eq.(3) as desired. From now, we consider the other case where precisely one of y 0 and y 1 is equal to 0; in the protocol, this is equivalent to γ a3;1 0 ⊕ γ a3;1 1 = 1, i.e., γ a3;1 = 1. Under the condition, the bit in Eq.(1) becomes 1 if and only if the other y i which is not equal to 0 is equal to (11 · · · 1) 2 = 2 n1 − 1 (i.e., γ a3;2 = γ a3;2 0 ⊕ γ a3;2 1 = 1 in the protocol) and Overflow(z 0 , z 1 ; 2 n2 ) = 1. By expanding the bit Overflow(z 0 , z 1 ; 2 n2 ) in the same way as the aforementioned case of Overflow(y 0 , y 1 ; 2 n1 ), it follows that the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to under the current condition. Note that the bit above is 0 when the current condition (i.e., precisely one of y 0 and y 1 is 0) is not satisfied.
Summarizing the arguments, the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to 
VIII. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here we show the experimental results of our gates and protocols we omit in Section V. 
